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1  Introduction
The title of the article refers to the representation of the poor. 
“Representation” is used here to refer to different contexts and institutional 
settings. First, it denotes the ways in which the interests and viewpoints of 
the poor are voiced, championed, overlooked and/or effaced in and through 
representative legislative bodies.1 Secondly, it refers to the ways in which 
courts, through constitutional interpretation and enforcement, affirm and 
reinforce the rights of the poor to democratic participation and citizenship, 
or fail to challenge their exclusion from effective democratic representation. 
The representation of the poor in and through representative institutions and 
through constitutional litigation and adjudication also touches upon a third 
meaning, which refers to the portrayal of “the poor” and the construction 
of their interests in legal and political discourse. This dimension is closely 
connected to the first two. The scope and meaning assigned to the rights of the 
poor to democratic representation and participation are, after all, inseparably 
linked to whether they are portrayed as active citizens or largely passive 
subjects of state authority.
The article considers different judicial constructions of democracy, 
and asks whether and to what extent these understandings can help 
reinforce the effective representation of the poor and affirm their rights to 
democratic citizenship and participation. Conversely, to what extent do 
these interpretations insulate relations of inequality and subordination from 
democratic debate and contestation and contribute to the silencing of the poor? 
The emphasis on judicial understandings of democracy draws attention to the 
adjudicative setting, and raises questions about the capacity of courts to serve 
as open democratic spaces in which the meaning of constitutional norms and 
* Thanks to Thabani Matshakaile for research assistance and to participants in the Law and Poverty 
Colloquium for valuable suggestions  The article also benefited from the incisive comments of an 
anonymous referee
1 Representation, in this sense, is intimately bound up with the claim of democratic states to rest on the 
consent of the governed or to institute the right of the people to self-government  At the same time, 
however, it raises questions about distortions in the democratic process, through which the right of the 
poor to participate in and influence the outcomes of political decisions is substantially diminished
       
commitments can be contested.2 At the same time, however, the topic points 
beyond the judiciary to legislatures as the primary institutions representing 
the people and to the people themselves. How is “the people” conceived in 
constitutional discourse? How is the relationship between the people and 
their representatives construed? And what are the conditions under which 
legislative bodies can be said to have made authoritative pronouncements in 
the name of the people they claim to represent?
Two conflicting conceptions of democracy are juxtaposed in this article, 
which are both derived from the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. The first 
can be labelled a dialogic, participatory and pluralistic model of democracy. This 
model underscores the agency and voice of those traditionally excluded from 
full citizenship; posits a dialogue between the people and their representatives; 
and requires the state to take positive steps to secure conditions under which 
citizens can exercise rights of democratic participation. It also embraces a 
vision of political equality which is suspicious of laws and practices which 
may have the effect of insulating social and political power from mechanisms 
designed to promote democratic accountability, or allowing the wealthy and 
powerful to pass off their particular interests as the common good. This 
understanding sets the bar quite high for legislative enactments to qualify as 
authoritative pronouncements made in the name of the people. It is suspicious 
of the idea of an identity of the people and their representatives, and assumes 
an active role for the courts in policing legislative and bureaucratic decisions 
to ensure that they emanate from inclusive participatory processes and do 
not impinge on basic norms of democratic accountability and responsiveness. 
The second conception, by contrast, conceives of democracy in more formal 
terms as the capacity of duly elected legislatures to enact law within their 
constitutional area of competence. Between elections, there is little that the 
people can do to hold their representatives accountable. Moreover, except in 
the case of a breach of clear, unambiguous constitutional provisions, courts 
should defer to the democratic legitimacy and institutional competence of the 
political branches.
The interplay between these two understandings calls for a far more 
extensive study of the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence than can be 
undertaken here, as judicial understandings of democracy influence decisions 
on issues as diverse as access to court, the application of the Bill of Rights to 
private relations, limitation analysis, remedies, and the substantive meaning of 
a broad range of constitutional norms such as equality, freedom of expression 
2 These include questions about the extent to which the courts’ actual jurisprudence has secured a space 
in which the poor can challenge official interpretations of constitutional norms which entrench their 
continued social, economic and political marginalisation  See, generally, J Dugard & T Roux “The Record 
of the South African Constitutional Court in Providing an Institutional Voice for the Poor: 1995-2004” 
in R Gargarella, P Domingo & T Roux (eds) Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies: An 
Institutional Voice for the Poor? (2006) 107  More theoretical questions relate to the spatial and aesthetic 
dimensions of adjudication (see W le Roux “From Acropolis to Metropolis: The New Constitutional Court 
Building and South African Street Democracy” (2001) 16 SAPL 139) and to whether the diverse needs 
and voices of the poor can be adequately represented in the language of the law  Much of the latter debate 
has centred on the tension between the Constitution’s transformative aspirations and the conservatism of 
South African legal culture  See K Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 
14 SAJHR 146  
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and socio-economic rights. The article focuses instead on two areas of the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. The first deals with public participation 
in the legislative process, while the second relates to constitutional challenges 
to the hegemony of political elites who are in a position to use their power and 
influence to privilege their own, particular interests over the public interest. 
Throughout, the emphasis will be on the ways in which the two conceptions 
of democracy under consideration relate to the rights, needs and voices of the 
poor.3
2  Public participation in the legislative process
2 1  Doctors for Life and Matatiele II’s promise
In Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly4 
the Constitutional Court held that the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (“the Constitution”) imposes an enforceable obligation on 
legislatures to facilitate public participation in the legislative process, and 
that non-compliance with this requirement must result in the constitutional 
invalidity of the legislation in question. Ngcobo J, writing for the majority, 
interpreted section 72(1)(a) of the Constitution5 in view of the right to 
political participation in international and foreign law and the importance 
of democratic participation in the struggle against apartheid and under the 
Constitution.6 On this construction, it is not enough simply to allow public 
participation. Parliament is under a positive obligation to ensure that citizens 
have an effective opportunity to participate in the legislative process. This 
is to be done through public education, the provision of information, and 
various other initiatives to bring democracy closer to the people.7 Although 
Parliament and the provincial legislatures must be allowed a broad discretion 
in deciding how best to fulfil this duty in a given case, the Constitutional 
Court has the power to test whether they afforded the public a reasonable 
opportunity to participate in the legislative process. What is reasonable 
will depend on a range of factors, including the nature and importance 
of the legislation, its impact on the public, its urgency, and Parliament’s 
3 These are of course not the only areas relating to the political participation of the poor  Other contexts 
of interest include the participation of the poor in administrative decision making, their exercise of 
democratic rights and freedoms (for example freedom of expression, association and assembly) and, 
indeed, contexts in which political participation occurs outside of the formal opportunities offered 
by state institutions (for example where alliances, communities or groups seize the political initiative 
through mass action, protests or petitions)  My decision in this article to focus on channels of participation 
relating directly to the logic and mechanisms of representative government does not signal the privileging 
of ”formal” or “state-centred” conceptions of democracy over “informal” or “decentred” understandings 
of democratic participation  In fact, the article’s resistance to the reduction of “the people” to a particular 
institutionalisation (for example “the people” as represented in Parliament) is perfectly consistent with 
an account of democracy which emphasises the capacity of the people to challenge decisions of their 
representatives, whether through formal or informal mechanisms  
4 2006 6 SA 416 (CC); 2006 12 BCLR 1399 (CC) (“Doctors for Life”)
5 S 72(1)(a) of the Constitution states that
“[t]he National Council of Provinces must facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other 
processes of the Council and its committees”
6 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC); 2006 12 BCLR 
1399 (CC) paras 90-117
7 Paras 130-134
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own views on what would be appropriate.8 Ngcobo J held that the failure 
of the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) to hold public hearings was 
unreasonable in relation to two of the four Acts that were being challenged. 
These two Acts – one of which dealt with the termination of pregnancies 
and the other with traditional health practitioners – related to controversial 
matters and were the subject of great public interest. He also emphasised 
the special role assigned to the NCOP in the legislative process. Since the 
NCOP is charged with the representation of the provinces in the national 
sphere of government, the facilitation of public involvement by the National 
Assembly is no substitute for public participation at the level of the NCOP 
and/or of the provincial legislatures.9
It is instructive to compare this judgment with the dissenting judgment of 
yacoob J. yacoob J’s disagreement with the majority turns in part on his use of 
grammatical and structural modes of interpretation. In his view, the majority 
judgment conflates “public involvement” with the stronger notion of “public 
participation”,10 overlooks the fact that section 72(1)(a) requires the NCOP 
merely to “facilitate” public involvement (which, he insists, is a less exacting 
requirement than to “promote” involvement),11 and misses the significance of 
the fact that section 72(1)(a) does not form part of the constitutional provisions 
relating to the legislative process.12 His insistence that it is the Court’s task 
to determine what the Constitution requires, and not to engage in theoretical 
speculation about the meaning of “democracy” or the ideal balance between 
its representative and participatory dimensions, is consistent with the 
textualist leaning of his judgment.13 However, the disagreement between the 
majority and minority judgments ultimately turns on more than differences 
in interpretive methodology. yacoob J’s interpretation of the constitutional 
text is informed by a particular understanding of democracy, in which the 
decisions of elected representatives are seen as identical with the will of the 
people. In the absence of a clear and unambiguous constitutional requirement 
of public participation in the legislative process, judicial enforcement of a 
“right” to political participation would “undermine the political will of the 
people” and “negate their choice at free and fair elections”.14 Such “failure 
to accord due weight to the actions and decisions of the representatives of 
the people of South Africa would demean the very struggle for democracy”15 
and impact fundamentally on “the value of the right to vote acquired through 
bitter struggle”.16
In this vision, there is a perfect identity of the people and their 
representatives, which is secured through the expression of the will of the 
people during free and fair elections. This unity or identity is bolstered through 
8 Paras 118-129, 145-146
9 Paras 79-88
10 Paras 308-312
11 Paras 303-307
12 Paras 315-318
13 Para 269
14 Para 292
15 Para 294
16 Para 319
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a variety of mechanisms designed to give effect to the constitutional values 
of accountability, responsiveness and openness. However, such mechanisms 
must either be rooted directly and unambiguously in the Constitution or in the 
decisions of the people’s representatives, and must not be judicially imposed 
on legislative majorities. Judicial imposition of a requirement of public 
participation would disturb the direct and “uninterrupted chain of legitimacy” 
running from the people to their representatives,17 and would thus demean 
the value of the right to vote.
Where yacoob J sees unity and identity, Ngcobo J in his majority 
judgment perceives a certain distance between the people and their 
representatives. The people, in his view, did not confer absolute authority 
on their representatives, but “reserved for themselves part of the sovereign 
legislative authority that they otherwise delegated to the representative 
bodies they created”.18 This residue of the people’s originary power precludes 
representative bodies from making totalising claims in the name of the 
people. Far from having an absolute claim to represent the people, based 
on the latter’s participation in elections every five years, the legitimacy of 
representative institutions needs to be strengthened through an on-going 
dialogue with the people who elected them. On this view, the right to vote 
is an important, but by no means the only institutionalisation of the right 
to political participation.19 Other forms of democratic participation help 
provide vitality to representative institutions and enhance the civic dignity 
of participants. They also counter the disproportionate effects of private 
wealth and power in the legislative process. Ngcobo J states that public 
participation
“because of its open and public character acts as a counterweight to secret lobbying and influence 
peddling. Participatory democracy is of special importance to those who are relatively disempowered 
in a country like ours where great disparities of wealth and influence exist.”20
For these reasons, participatory democracy has an important role to play in 
promoting political equality and integrating the marginalised and poor into 
the democratic community.21
17 The phrase is borrowed from E-W Böckenförde “Demokratische Willensbildung und Repräsentation” 
in J Isensee & P Kirchhof (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bd III 3 ed 
(2004) 31 38
18 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC); 2006 12 BCLR 
1399 (CC) para 110
19 Para 98
20 Para 115
21 See paras 171, 174 on the importance of adequate consultation with traditional healers, particularly in 
view of their previously marginalised status  See also the concurring judgment of Sachs J para 234:
“Public involvement will also be of particular significance for members of groups that have been the 
victims of processes of historical silencing  It is constitutive of their dignity as citizens today that they 
not only have a chance to speak, but also enjoy the assurance they will be listened to  This would be of 
special relevance for those who may feel politically disadvantaged at present because they lack higher 
education, access to resources and strong political connections ”
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In Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa (2)22 
the constitutionality of the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005 and 
the Cross-Boundary Municipalities Laws Repeal and Related Matters Act 23 
of 2005 was at issue. The effect of this legislative package was, inter alia, 
that the Matatiele Municipality was removed from the province of KwaZulu-
Natal and incorporated into the Eastern Cape. This triggered section 74(8) of 
the Constitution, which requires a constitutional amendment which alters the 
provincial boundaries of a particular province or provinces to be approved 
by the legislature[s] of the province[s] concerned. While the Eastern Cape 
Legislature did hold public hearings, the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature approved 
the constitutional amendment without facilitating public involvement. Ngcobo 
J in his majority judgment rejected the contention that it was not necessary to 
facilitate public consultation as the legislature was speaking on behalf of the 
people of the province. The Constitution, in his view, does not unquestioningly 
assume the identity of the people and their representatives, but envisages “a 
dialogue between the elected representatives of the people and the people 
themselves”.23
The majority advanced a number of reasons for holding that the provincial 
legislature’s conduct fell short of section 118(1)(a) of the Constitution, which 
requires a provincial legislature to facilitate public involvement in its legislative 
and other processes. Chief among these was the impact of the legislation on the 
community of Matatiele. Their emotional attachment to KwaZulu-Natal, their 
right to live in the province of their choice and the practical significance of the 
move for service delivery militated against the idea that their relocation to the 
Eastern Cape could be effected without proper consultation. The conclusion 
that they should have been afforded an opportunity to make submissions was 
also supported by other considerations. These include: the fact that they were 
“a discrete and identifiable section of the population”;24 the unique nature 
of the provincial power to veto constitutional amendments and its centrality 
to the constitutional scheme;25 and the fact that both the NCOP and the 
KwaZulu-Natal Legislature considered public hearings to be desirable.26
The reasoning in Doctors for Life and Matatiele II seems particularly 
promising when viewed from the perspective of the representation of the poor 
and other vulnerable groups. This is so for at least four reasons. First, these 
judgments emphasise the agency and voice of those traditionally excluded 
from democratic citizenship. Far from being viewed as helpless victims, the 
poor are regarded as bearers of fundamental human dignity who are entitled 
22 2007 1 BCLR 47 (CC) (“Matatiele II”)  The legislative package was originally challenged on the basis 
that Parliament had usurped the powers of the Municipal Demarcation Board to re-determine municipal 
boundaries  In Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa (1) 2006 5 SA 47 (CC); 
2006 5 BCLR 622 (CC) (“Matatiele I”) this challenge was rejected  However, although the point was not 
relied on by the applicants, the Court directed the parties to make submissions on whether the KwaZulu-
Natal Provincial Legislature was obliged to facilitate participation, and if so, whether it had complied 
with this obligation
23 Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa (2) 2007 1 BCLR 47 (CC) para 58
24 Para 79
25 Paras 46-48
26 Paras 76-78
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to participate in processes of collective decision making. Secondly, this 
jurisprudence does not content itself with a merely abstract understanding of 
the opportunity to participate in democratic processes, but requires the state 
to take positive steps to secure conditions under which citizens – including 
the poor and marginalised – can exercise rights of democratic participation. 
Thirdly, because the judgments in question resist assumptions about the unity 
of the citizenry or the identity of the electorate and their representatives, they 
are less prone to subsuming the needs and interests of the poor under vague 
notions of the “common interest”. One-size-fits-all solutions imposed from 
above do not sit well with the Court’s emphasis on the particularity of needs 
and the distinctness of the voices of those affected. Finally, these judgments rest 
upon a conception of political equality which is inconsistent with the capacity 
of the wealthy and powerful to pass off their private interests as the public 
interest or to insulate their power and influence from mechanisms designed 
to promote democratic accountability. The right to public participation vests 
in every person affected by a decision, regardless of her income or social 
status. It can therefore be expected to play an important role in countering 
private power and influence, and ensuring that a broader range of interests and 
viewpoints – including those of the marginalised and poor – are heard.
Subsequent to these two judgments, the theme of public participation has 
also made its influence felt in other contexts. The state has been required 
to engage meaningfully with individuals and communities affected by 
intrusive forms of government action such as evictions.27 In these cases, too, 
the Court has emphasised the agency and voice of the poor and has treated 
them as equal participants in a constitutional dialogue involving the state, 
land owners and poverty-stricken communities.28 The Court has also held 
that the President’s failure to afford victims an opportunity to participate 
in proceedings concerning the possible pardoning of individuals claiming 
to have been convicted of offences committed with a political motive was 
irrational and hence unconstitutional.29
27 See Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v City of Johannesburg 2008 5 BCLR 475 (CC) and 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2009 9 BCLR 847 (CC) on the 
requirement of meaningful engagement in eviction cases  See also Beja v Premier of the Western Cape 
2011 3 All SA 401 (WCC), where the City of Cape Town failed to adhere to the National Housing Code’s 
community participation requirements and the “agreement” between the City and the residents for the 
installation of unenclosed toilets was found to be neither valid nor enforceable
28 In an earlier case concerning an application for the eviction of occupiers from privately owned land, 
Sachs J declared that
“those seeking evictions should be encouraged not to rely on concepts of faceless and anonymous 
squatters automatically to be expelled as obnoxious social nuisances  Such a stereotypical approach 
has no place in the society envisaged by the Constitution; justice and equity require that everyone is 
to be treated as an individual bearer of rights entitled to respect for his or her dignity  At the same 
time those who find themselves compelled by poverty and landlessness to live in shacks on the land of 
others, should be discouraged from regarding themselves as helpless victims, lacking the possibilities 
of personal moral agency  The tenacity and ingenuity they show in making homes out of discarded 
material, in finding work and sending their children to school, are a tribute to their capacity for 
survival and adaptation  Justice and equity oblige them to rely on the same resourcefulness in seeking 
a solution to their plight and to explore all reasonable possibilities of securing suitable alternative 
accommodation or land ” (Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC); 2004 
12 BCLR 1268 (CC) para 41)  
29 Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 2010 3 SA 293 (CC); 2010 5 BCLR 391 
(CC)  
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2 2  Merafong and Poverty Alleviation Network’s rider
The duty of provincial legislatures to facilitate public involvement in relation 
to constitutional amendments which affect the boundaries of a specific province 
or provinces also came up in Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of 
the Republic of South Africa.30 The legislation in question abolished cross-
boundary municipalities and transferred the part of Merafong which had 
formerly formed part of Gauteng to North West. From the outset, the proposed 
amendment gave rise to vehement opposition. Against the background of mass 
protests and calls for a public hearing, the Gauteng Provincial Legislature held 
a joint public hearing with the North West Legislature. After the conclusion 
of the hearing, the relevant portfolio committee of the Gauteng Legislature 
adopted a written negotiating mandate which detailed the reasons for the 
community’s opposition. The mandate mirrored the community’s demands. It 
supported the phasing out of cross-border municipalities, and recommended 
the inclusion of the municipal area of Merafong in Gauteng. When this mandate 
was presented to the Select Committee of the NCOP, the latter’s legal advisors 
pointed out that it was not competent for the Gauteng Provincial Legislature 
to propose amendments to the Bill in question. Three days later, the portfolio 
committee reversed its original decision and authorised its delegation to the 
NCOP to vote in favour of the Bill. The Bill was passed, and Merafong was 
incorporated into North West.
The majority of the Court rejected the applicants’ contention that the 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature had failed to facilitate public involvement. Van 
der Westhuizen J pointed out that, while the legislature was constitutionally 
obliged to be open to the views expressed by the public, they were not bound 
by them.31 In his view, the fact that the provincial legislature changed its line 
after consulting with the NCOP does not suggest that the public meeting was 
a mere charade, or that the incorporation of Merafong into North West was 
always a done deal. The legislature was open to persuasion by the views of the 
community, as reflected in its negotiating mandate, and there is no evidence 
that the reversal of that position in the final voting mandate points to a lack of 
good faith. Moreover, the legislature’s failure to inform the community that 
it was no longer possible to adhere to the position taken in the negotiating 
mandate was “possibly disrespectful”,32 but not unreasonable. Another round 
of public consultation would have served little or no purpose, as it was unlikely 
that either the legislature or the community would be swayed by the other’s 
arguments. The judge also rejected the argument that the legislature’s decision 
was irrational, and found that it was not based on a mistaken understanding 
30 2008 5 SA 171 (CC); 2008 10 BCLR 968 (CC) (“Merafong”)
31 “Government certainly can be expected to be responsive to the needs and wishes of minorities or interest 
groups, but our constitutional system of government would not be able to function if the Legislature 
were bound by these views  The public participation in the legislative process, which the Constitution 
envisages, is supposed to supplement and enhance the democratic nature of general elections and majority 
rule, not to conflict with or even overrule or veto them ” (Para 50)
32 Para 55
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of its powers or responsibilities under the Constitution or of the consequences 
of a legislative veto.33
Only one of the judges held that the provincial legislature had acted in 
breach of its constitutional obligation to facilitate public consultation. Sachs 
J found that its failure to go back to the community and explain its about-
turn was unreasonable in view of the nature of the legislation, its potentially 
drastic impact on the community and the expectations created by the 
recommendations of the Municipal Demarcation Board and the adoption of 
the negotiating mandate. It slighted the civic dignity of the people of Merafong 
and created the perception that the consultation process was a sham.34 The 
Court was more evenly split on the question whether the legislature had acted 
irrationally. Moseneke DCJ, in a dissent concurred in by three other judges, 
held that the legislature had laboured under a fundamental misconception 
of its powers under section 74(8). It appeared to believe that its exercise 
of the veto power would result in the withdrawal of the entire amendment 
Bill and a consequent return to a system of cross-boundary municipalities. 
This, stated Moseneke DCJ, was clearly incorrect, as the province only had 
a veto over changes to its specific boundaries. Its exercise of the veto would 
therefore not prevent the abolition of cross-border municipalities, and would 
be perfectly consistent with its stated objectives of phasing out cross-border 
municipalities and preventing the incorporation of Merafong into North West. 
The legislature’s about-turn was accordingly not in pursuance of a legitimate 
objective and was therefore irrational.35
A fourth case arose from the legislative response to the Matatiele II 
judgment. Legislation (including a constitutional amendment) providing for 
the incorporation of Matatiele in the Eastern Cape was adopted anew, this 
time after a fairly extensive process of public consultation at the national and 
provincial levels. In Poverty Alleviation Network v President of the Republic 
of South Africa,36 the Constitutional Court held unanimously that the relevant 
legislative bodies had complied with their constitutional obligation to facilitate 
public consultation. The Court rejected the contention that the consultation 
facilitated by Parliament and the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature was a sham, and 
pointed out that the applicants’ submissions had been discussed during the 
deliberations of the portfolio committees and that a report on issues relating 
to service delivery had been compiled. A challenge based on the alleged 
irrationality of the decision was also dismissed.
2 3  Re-assessment
The judgments in Merafong and Poverty Alleviation Network raise several 
questions. Do these judgments stand for the proposition that legislative 
majorities are free to push through their party-political agendas, provided that 
they first go through the motions of public consultation? Do they signal a return 
33 Paras 62-115
34 Paras 292-298
35 See paras 166-192
36 2010 6 BCLR 520 (CC) (“Poverty Alleviation Network”)
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to the more deferential approach that characterised the Court’s political rights 
jurisprudence prior to Doctors for Life and Matatiele II?37 Do they renege 
on the promise of those two cases, and revert back to a thinner conception 
of democracy that has relatively little to say to the struggles of the poor and 
destitute to overcome their economic, social and political marginalisation?
These questions may appear rather too harsh. After all, there is nothing 
in Doctors for Life or Matatiele II that suggests that legislatures are bound 
by the views expressed during rounds of public consultation. The reasoning 
in Merafong and Poverty Alleviation Network seems consistent with the 
insistence in those two cases that legislatures must be allowed a broad margin 
of discretion in deciding how best to facilitate public consultation. It also seems 
consistent with the idea, reiterated in numerous cases, that judges inquiring 
into the rationality of exercises of public power are not to substitute their own 
views on policy issues for those of the relevant authorities. Once meaningful 
public consultation has taken place, a court must respect the legislature’s 
power to make a final, binding decision, as long as that decision is rational.
Indeed, one should not be too quick to conclude, simply on the basis of 
the outcomes of these cases, that the Court has reverted back to a shallow 
conception of democracy and an overly deferential posture which has little 
to offer the poor. The value of public participation cannot and should not 
be reduced to the question whether participants were able to convince the 
legislature of their views. Even when measured in purely instrumental terms, 
public participation may be of value in cases in which the participants’ 
views ultimately did not carry the day. Neither in Merafong nor in Poverty 
Alleviation Network can it be said that the communities’ concerns over service 
delivery fell on deaf ears. In Merafong the portfolio committee proposed, in 
their report to the Gauteng Provincial Legislature, a service delivery audit on 
the basis of which recommendations would be made to North West Province. 
And in Poverty Alleviation Network, a report on service delivery issues was 
compiled on the basis of the community’s inputs. Therefore, even in cases 
where the legislature is not swayed by the inputs of communities and groups, 
the latter’s participation in public processes of engagement may help raise 
public and legislative awareness of their needs and concerns, and may provide 
occasion for further democratic engagement and mobilisation.
And yet, it is hard to shake the feeling that, in these cases, the vision of 
democracy articulated in Doctors for Life and Matatiele II has either been 
diluted or has stumbled upon its own limits. In the first place, the majority 
judgment of Van der Westhuizen J (who was one of the dissenters in the 
two earlier cases) in Merafong rests on assumptions that are hard to square 
37 See the discussion of United Democratic Movement v President of the RSA 2002 11 BCLR 1179 (CC) in 
part 3 below  It must, however, be pointed out that not all the earlier decisions were informed by a shallow 
conception of democracy  Important precursors to the deeper understanding of democracy articulated in 
Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC); 2006 12 BCLR 
1399 (CC) and Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa (2) 2007 1 BCLR 47 
(CC) include the minority judgments of O’Regan J and Sachs J in Democratic Alliance v Masondo 2003 
2 SA 413 (CC); 2003 2 BCLR 128 (CC); and Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd 2006 2 SA 311 
(CC); 2006 1 BCLR 1 (CC) (see particularly paras 111-113 and the judgment of Sachs J)
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with the depth of the vision of democracy embraced in Doctors for Life and 
Matatiele II. Consider, for instance, his argument that a further round of 
public consultation would serve little purpose – beside showing courtesy to 
the inhabitants of Merafong – as it was unlikely that the parties would be able 
to reach a common understanding. This argument is surprising in view of his 
conclusion that it could not be proved that the provincial legislature’s reversal 
of its original decision was “directly or indirectly influenced by previously 
formulated policies of the ruling party”.38 Seeing that the legislature offered 
no cogent explanation for its sudden about-turn and since the judge rejected 
the contention that the change was dictated by political superiors, it is not 
clear how he could be so certain that the legislature would not be open to ideas 
that might result from a new round of consultation. One possible explanation 
is proffered: the effect of an exercise of the legislative veto would be that the 
municipality of Merafong would be split into two, one falling in Gauteng and 
the other in North West. This was apparently not what either the community 
or the legislature had envisaged. In view of this reality, the judge seems to 
suggest, there was not much to discuss – the legislature simply had to choose 
between two options, one of which would result in the bigger part of Merafong 
remaining in Gauteng, while the other would bring about the relocation of the 
entire municipality to North West.
The judgment assumes that participation primarily has instrumental value 
as a means to the coordination of conflicting interests or as a mechanism to 
bolster the legitimacy of laws in the eyes of the people. Where participation 
in the legislative process cannot reasonably be expected to forge consensus 
among legislative majorities and members of the public, the legislature is 
not obliged to report back to the community or to initiate a further round 
of public consultation in cases in which it has reversed its original decision. 
Where, as here, the positions of the legislature and general public appear 
irreconcilable, a further round of consultation would serve little or no purpose. 
This reasoning makes sense if we accept the judgment’s assumption that 
democratic deliberation consists in arms-length transactions between rational 
actors each seeking to maximise their own interests. There are, however, good 
reasons to be wary of this understanding of democracy. For one, this vision of 
democracy is far from uncontested. There is a tradition in democratic theory 
that is critical of the reduction of the political process to the coordination of 
conflicting interests and insists that democratic participation has an expressive 
and constitutive value that cannot be captured in purely instrumental terms.39 
In this view, it is through political participation that citizens become aware 
of their mutual dependence, learn to respect each other’s viewpoints and, 
through their deliberations about the common good, engage on a path of 
moral self-discovery which may give rise to a reconsideration of their private 
beliefs and perceptions of their own interests. For another, this second vision 
38 Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 5 SA 171 (CC); 2008 10 
BCLR 968 (CC) para 50
39 See J Habermas Between Facts and Norms (1996) 18-19 on the distinction between communicative and 
strategic action; and D Held Models of Democracy 3 ed (2006) on the distinction between theories viewing 
democracy as an end in itself and those seeing it as a means to the end of securing private freedom
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of democratic deliberation resonates with the deliberative and participatory 
stands in the South African Constitution40 and with the reasoning in Doctors 
for Life and Matatiele II, which posits a dialogue between citizens and their 
representatives. That this dialogue does not simply have instrumental value 
and is not premised solely on the idea of arms-length negotiations between 
self-interested actors is clear from the judgment of Ngcobo J in Doctors 
for Life, which emphasises that public participation enhances the civic 
dignity of participants and “promotes a spirit of democratic and pluralistic 
accommodation”.41
The majority judgment of Van der Westhuizen J in Merafong vividly 
illustrates the limits of an instrumental vision of democracy. His judgment 
apparently views public consultation as a one-off event and is unconcerned 
with building more lasting forms of civic engagement and trust.42 It is blind 
to the possibility that democratic deliberation could persuade political actors 
to reconsider their perceptions of their own interests or open up novel ways 
of seeing and thinking about the problem.43 It is fixated on established 
institutions, and finds it hard to conceive of the possibility that political 
contestation and struggles outside these institutions could have a significant 
bearing on the democratic character of the law. Ultimately, this construction 
of the legislature’s duty to facilitate participation does little to challenge or 
interrupt a merely formal conception of democracy as the capacity of duly 
elected legislatures to enact law within their constitutional area of competence. 
In fact, it is perfectly congruent with it.
Secondly, the facts in Merafong and Poverty Alleviation Network draw 
attention to the power of the ruling party to instruct its members how to vote. In 
both these cases, the Court dismissed claims that ANC legislators were under 
instructions from the party and were therefore not open to be persuaded by the 
public’s views. In Merafong, it was held that it was “not possible to determine 
whether and to what extent the final voting mandate and the debate in the 
NCOP Select Committee were directly or indirectly influenced by previously 
40 A number of authors have argued that the South African Constitution envisages a heterogeneous public 
sphere in which democratic participation is an end in itself and the public interest cannot and should not 
be reduced to the sum of private interests  See, for example, AJ van der Walt “Un-Doing Things with 
Words: The Colonisation of the Public Sphere by Private-Property Discourse” in G Bradfield & D van 
der Merwe (eds) “Meaning” in Legal Interpretation (1998) 235; H Botha “Civic Republicanism and Legal 
Education” (2000) 41 Codicillus 23; Le Roux (2001) SAPL 139; K van Marle “Lives of Action, Thinking 
and Revolt – A Feminist Call for Politics and Becoming in Post-Apartheid South Africa” (2004) 19 SAPL 
605; J van der Walt Law and Sacrifice: Towards a Post-Apartheid Theory of Law (2005)
41 Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 (CC); 2006 12 BCLR 
1399 (CC) para 115  
42 Sachs J implicitly levels this critique against the majority when he states, in relation to the legislature’s 
failure to explain its decision to the community:
“Arms-length democracy is not participatory democracy, and the consequent and predictable rupture 
in the relationship between the community and the Legislature tore at the heart of what participatory 
democracy aims to achieve ” (Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2008 5 SA 171 (CC); 2008 10 BCLR 968 (CC) para 300)
43 One would have expected a new round of consultation not only to create a better understanding on the part 
of residents of the reasons for the legislature’s change of mind, but also to provide some insight into the 
community’s views on the possible division of Merafong into two municipalities falling in two separate 
provinces  It is even conceivable that a clearer understanding of the options available to the legislature 
under the Constitution might crystallise in the course of such consultation, or that new political alliances 
might be forged or alternative strategies be devised
532 STELL LR 2011 3
       
formulated policies of the ruling party”.44 And in Poverty Alleviation Network, 
the rationality challenge was brushed off with reference to the distinction 
between the purpose of the legislation and Parliament’s motives in enacting 
it. It was held that while the court can test for rationality, it is not in a position 
to inquire into the motives of legislators.45 These judgments raise questions 
about the capacity of the Court’s jurisprudence to respond to situations in 
which an open-minded consideration of inputs is precluded by the hegemony 
of particular interests masquerading as the ruling party’s understanding of the 
public interest. It is to these issues that I now turn.
3  Keeping private interests at bay
Allegations that a political party or parties have used their numerical 
majority to introduce legislation to cement their own position or to shield 
politicians or officials from oversight by the legislature or independent 
institutions, have featured in a number of cases. In United Democratic 
Movement v President of the RSA,46 the Constitutional Court considered 
the constitutionality of legislation (including a constitutional amendment) 
which allowed members of legislatures at the national, provincial and local 
government levels to cross the floor to another party without losing their seats. 
The Court rejected the contention that the legislation, which was triggered 
by a split in the Democratic Alliance, undermined the basic structure of 
the Constitution, was inconsistent with the idea of multiparty democracy 
as entrenched in section 1 of the Constitution, or violated the constitutional 
right to vote. The Court’s restrictive understanding of democracy and failure 
to give content to “multiparty democracy” have been widely criticised. Its 
rejection of the argument that a system of proportional representation requires 
an anti-defection clause47 and its finding that the 10% threshold, which made 
it considerably easier to defect from smaller parties than from larger ones did 
not result in the unconstitutionality of the legislation,48 appear to rest on the 
premise that the courts will generally defer to the electoral scheme devised 
by Parliament, and will intervene only in cases where it is in clear and direct 
conflict with the Constitution. This, together with its insistence that between 
elections, “voters have no control over the conduct of their representatives”,49 
raises questions over the depth of the Court’s understanding of democracy 
and over the capacity of its jurisprudence to help secure conditions in which 
representatives can be held accountable by the electorate.
Subsequent judgments have shown a somewhat richer and more nuanced 
understanding of “multiparty democracy”. The concurring judgment of 
Sachs J in Democratic Alliance v Masondo50 – a case concerning the 
44 Merafong Demarcation Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa 2008 5 SA 171 (CC); 2008 10 
BCLR 968 (CC) para 50
45 Poverty Alleviation Network v President of the Republic of South Africa 2010 6 BCLR 520 (CC) para 73
46 2002 11 BCLR 1179 (CC) (“UDM”)
47 Paras 28-35
48 Paras 46-47  
49 Para 49
50 2003 2 SA 413 (CC); 2003 2 BCLR 128 (CC)
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question whether opposition parties are entitled to representation on mayoral 
committees – evinces a strong commitment to a pluralistic and deliberative 
democracy, and shows sensitivity to the intersections and tensions between 
deliberation and majority rule and between inclusivity and effective service 
delivery. And in African Christian Democratic Party v The Electoral 
Commission,51 the Court preferred an interpretation of a legislative provision 
which promoted multiparty democracy and citizens’ political rights over a 
more restrictive interpretation. Whether the Court’s sensitivity in these cases 
to democratic participation, inclusivity and citizenship signals a greater 
willingness to subject measures to rigorous scrutiny which are purportedly 
aimed at upholding the hegemony of a particular party or parties, or insulating 
party bosses from accountability is, however, uncertain.52
If that is indeed the case, the message was apparently lost on the Cape High 
Court in IDASA v African National Congress.53 In that case it was held that 
political parties are private bodies in relation to their fundraising activities. 
Applications for access to their fundraising records in terms of the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 can, as a result, only succeed if the 
applicants can show that they reasonably require the information in order to 
exercise their rights. In the view of the Court, section 19 of the Constitution 
does not confer a right to the disclosure of political parties’ sources of funding. 
The applicants were accordingly not entitled to access these records. The judge 
noted, however, that the applicants had made out a “compelling case” in favour 
of the need for specific legislation to regulate the disclosure of private donations 
to political parties.54 Although he is right that the legislature would be better 
equipped than the courts to deal with the complexity of these issues, one cannot 
help but feel that an important opportunity was lost for establishing the principle 
that political parties, which occupy such a central role and wield so much public 
power in a list system of proportional representation, are constitutionally 
required to conduct themselves in an open, responsive and transparent manner. 
The finding that parties do not act as public bodies when receiving private 
funding is particularly ironic. It is precisely the “fluidity” and “permeability” 
of the distinction between their “public” and “private” functions55 which makes 
it imperative to require political parties to disclose their sources of funding, as 
corruption, nepotism and secret lobbying thrive in that grey area between public 
power and private influence. To hold that they act in a private capacity when 
51 2006 5 BCLR 579 (CC)  The Court held that the ACDP had complied with a requirement in the Local 
Government: Municipal Electoral Act 27 of 2000 that a party contesting an election must submit a deposit 
to the IEC’s local representative in circumstances where the party, not having submitted a deposit to the 
local office in Cape Town, requested the IEC to allocate a surplus payment made by it as a deposit for 
the Cape Town Metro  But see also Electoral Commission v Inkatha Freedom Party 2011 9 BCLR 943 
(CC)  The Court distinguished the facts from those in ACDP, and held that the requirement that election 
documentation be submitted at the local office of the IEC served a central and significant legislative 
purpose and helped maintain the integrity of the electoral process  
52 See G Quinot “Snapshot or Participatory Democracy? Political Engagement as Fundamental Human 
Right” (2009) 25 SAJHR 392 for a critique of the courts’ fixation on the act of voting and neglect of the 
democratic processes leading up to and underpinning elections
53 2005 10 BCLR 995 (C)
54 Para 58
55 Para 29
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receiving funding is to submit rather meekly to the power of private interests to 
determine, twist and distort the public interest.
A recent judgment of the Constitutional Court has been hailed by some 
as an important victory for the rights of the poor. In Glenister v President 
of the Republic of South Africa,56 the Court held that the independence of 
the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) was not adequately 
safeguarded. To that extent, the impugned legislation was in violation of the 
state’s constitutional obligation to establish and maintain an independent 
anti-corruption entity. In their majority judgment Moseneke DCJ and 
Cameron J relied on section 7(2) of the Constitution, which obliges the state 
to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” the rights in the Bill of Rights, 
to construe a positive state duty to create an effective and integrated 
anti-corruption strategy. Viewing this duty through the prism of section 
39(1)(b), which states that a court interpreting the Bill of Rights “must consider 
international law”, they concluded on the basis of a range of international 
conventions and agreements acceded to by South Africa that it includes the 
obligation to establish an anti-corruption unit that is sufficiently independent. 
The legislation in question fell short of this requirement in several respects. 
Members of the DPCI enjoyed no special security of tenure, and a ministerial 
committee was given the power to issue policy guidelines and to oversee the 
DPCI’s functioning. In the judges’ view, these features created a real risk of 
political influence on investigations, which compromised the capacity of the 
DPCI to act fearlessly and independently, particularly in high profile cases 
involving senior politicians and government officials.
The judgment has drawn sharp criticism. Ziyad Motala has lashed out at the 
majority: in his view, their judgment takes leave of the constitutional text and 
accepted canons of interpretation, makes questionable use of international 
law, and usurps Parliament’s policymaking function. In the absence of clear 
constitutional guidelines on the institutional home of and lines of command 
within the anti-corruption unit, the Court ought to have respected the 
legislature’s decision to locate it within the Department of Police.57 These 
sentiments are echoed in statements by President Zuma58 and Gwede Mantashe. 
Mantashe warned that judgments like Glenister “cast aspersions on the work 
of Parliament”, involve the Court in the “political weighting of views”, and 
56 2011 3 SA 347 (CC); 2011 7 BCLR 651 (CC) (“Glenister”)  There was a narrow five/four split between 
the majority and minority  In his dissenting judgment, Ngcobo J held inter alia that international law 
cannot be used to create constitutional obligations (paras 88-103), that the state’s obligation to protect the 
rights in the Bill of Rights can be fulfilled in a number of ways (paras 105-113), that the legislature enjoys 
considerable leeway in deciding how best to ensure the DPCI’s independence (paras 107, 111, 114) and 
that the Act contains adequate safeguards to ensure the DPCI’s independence (paras 132-156)  
57 Z Motala “Divination through a Strange Lens” Sunday Times (27-03-2011)  
58 Zuma’s recent admonition to judges not to usurp the executive’s policy making function has been 
understood as a reference to the Glenister ruling  Zuma’s address, which was delivered at the Third Access 
to Justice Conference in Pretoria, is available at PoliticsWeb <http://www politicsweb co za/politicsweb/
view/politicsweb/en/page71656?oid=244907&sn=Detail&pid=71616> (accessed 29-08-2011)  
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represent a “slippery road” which may lead to the judiciary “seeking to arrest 
the functioning of Parliament”.59
The decision to locate a crime investigating unit within a particular 
government department and the setting up of mechanisms to provide lines 
of accountability and oversight are issues over which Parliament typically 
enjoys a wide margin of discretion. The conventional wisdom that a court, 
in deciding the constitutionality of laws, should not concern itself with 
the wisdom of particular policy choices would, ordinarily, preclude courts 
from interfering with decisions that are intimately bound up with the policy 
choices informing the design of law-enforcement agencies. In the absence of 
a clear constitutional preference for one model over another, a decision which 
overturns the legislative scheme designed by Parliament risks being seen as an 
unauthorised judicial transgression on the powers and functions of legislative 
bodies. Because they believe that the constitutional rights and values and the 
international legal materials relied upon by the majority are inconclusive as 
to the specific institutional framework within which an anti-corruption entity 
must operate, the critics aver that the majority judgment ultimately rests on 
ideological rather than legal premises and usurps legislative power.
I find some of these criticisms problematic. A constitution does not always 
wear its meaning on its sleeve and interpretations arrived at through rigorous 
and sometimes arduous engagement with the constitutional text, structure 
and values and the social and historical context are not for that reason less 
compelling than interpretations that immediately strike us as right or even 
inevitable. I am also uncomfortable with the binary opposition between 
“legal” and “ideological” decision making. The right question to ask is not 
whether this is a legal or political judgment, but whether it is based on a 
plausible interpretation of the Constitution – a legal document that structures 
public power through an intricate network of institutions, procedures, rights 
and values that is political at its core. If the judgment places too much strain 
on the constitutional text or fails to integrate the various reasons advanced 
for it into a coherent and defensible reading of the Constitution, that is cause 
for criticising the Court’s reasoning, not for concluding that it has forsaken its 
judicial mandate in favour of an overtly political role.
Despite the progressive tone of the majority judgment, there is nevertheless 
something odd about the way it jumps from the state’s obligation to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights to an analysis of the 
extent to which the DPCI’s independence is secured. For a start there is no 
rights analysis. It is simply stated, without arguing, that the rights infringed 
by the state’s failure to establish a sufficiently independent anti-corruption 
unit include “the rights to equality, human dignity, freedom, security of the 
59 See Anonymous “Mantashe’s ConCourt Remarks Scandalous: DA” (18-08-2011) News 24 <http://www
news24 com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Mantashes-ConCourt-remarks-scandalous-DA-20110818> (accessed 
29-08-2011)
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person, administrative justice and socio-economic rights, including the rights 
to education, housing, and health care”.60
The foray into international law, which is expressly undertaken in terms 
of section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution’s injunction to consider international 
law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights, does not shed any light on the 
content of these rights either. The inquiry centres on institutional issues of 
independence, and no attempt is made to explain how a failure to adhere to 
international standards impacts on the rights in question.61 Given the paucity 
of rights analysis, it does not come as a surprise that there is no limitation 
analysis either. Noting that the respondents offered no justification of the 
limitation, the Court concludes the limitation inquiry simply by stating that a 
justification would in any event be “hard to advance”.62
The only clue to the link between the rights in the Bill of Rights and 
institutional issues of independence comes in the form of statements, 
references and quotations which refer, in the most general terms, to the effects 
of corruption on democracy, the rule of law, societal safety and security, and 
the socio-economic upliftment of the poor. For instance, we are told that 
corruption
“blatantly undermines the democratic ethos, the institutions of democracy, the rule of law and the 
foundational values of our nascent constitutional project. It fuels maladministration and public 
fraudulence and imperils the capacity of the state to fulfil its obligations to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil all the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights. When corruption and organised crime flourish, 
sustainable development and economic growth are stunted. And in turn, the stability and security of 
society is put at risk.”63
The judges also quote from a statement by Kofi Annan, which emphasises 
corruption’s detrimental effects on the rights of the poor:
“[I]t is in the developing world that [the effects of corruption] are most destructive. Corruption hurts 
the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government’s 
basic ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign 
investment and aid. Corruption is a key element in economic under-performance, and a major obstacle 
to poverty alleviation and development.”64
The first statement notes the negative impact of corruption on the 
“democratic ethos” and the “institutions of democracy”, but does not 
explain how this negative impact occurs. The second statement does not 
60 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC); 2011 7 BCLR 651 (CC) para 
198  No attempt is made to relate these findings to the Court’s earlier jurisprudence or to explain how they 
fit in with the standards (for example: the reasonableness standard in relation to socio-economic rights) 
enunciated in earlier cases  The specific subsections that are infringed are not even mentioned
61 See paras 179-202
62 Para 203  Perhaps it does not really matter that the judges’ recourse to a two-stage inquiry is more apparent 
than real  As an anonymous referee helpfully points out, the judgment does not hinge on a finding of a 
direct infringement of the Bill of Rights, but relies instead on the state’s more general failure to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights  Given corruption’s threat to a number of rights 
it may have been sufficient for the majority to find, as it did with reference to international law, that the 
failure to establish an independent anti-corruption unit was at odds with the state’s obligations in terms of 
s 7(2) of the Constitution  This may be so, but it would nevertheless have contributed significantly to the 
judgment’s persuasive value if the Court engaged in a more rigorous analysis of corruption’s impact on 
constitutional rights and values
63 Para 166
64 Para 167
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refer to democracy, but can be read to imply that one of the ways in which 
corruption impacts on basic service delivery and perpetuates inequality is by 
undermining a government’s democratic legitimacy and by obstructing the 
mechanisms of democratic accountability. Democracy, it seems, is viewed 
mainly in instrumental terms. Norms of democratic accountability are valued 
to the extent that they boost the state’s capacity to alleviate poverty, redress 
inequality and ensure a dignified life for all. The possibility that democracy 
may be constitutive of – at least some of – the rights in question65 or that the 
rights of citizens to political participation may be at stake here is apparently 
not considered.
These lines of inquiry might have provided a sounder basis for the Court’s 
attempt to establish a link between the Bill of Rights and institutional issues 
of independence. Representatives and officials whose primary allegiance is 
to those who fund their lavish lifestyles or whose donations oil the party’s 
machinery make a mockery of the ideals of democratic accountability, 
openness and responsiveness. In the first place, their willingness to place 
private interests above the public interest dilutes the importance of the right 
to vote and diminishes the impact of democratic participation. Corruption and 
political patronage thus strike at the heart of democratic citizenship and rights 
of political participation. They deny basic political equality and re-introduce 
gradations and hierarchies based on wealth and influence into the very notion 
of citizenship.66 Secondly, as Choudry points out, corruption and patronage 
flourish in dominant party democracies in which there has been a shift of 
power from the ruling party’s parliamentary to its non-parliamentary wing. In 
such societies the separation between state and party gets increasingly blurred, 
legislators and officials come to depend on the goodwill of party leaders 
whose mandate derives not from the electorate but from the party, and public 
resources (for example state contracts and government positions) become an 
indispensable tool in struggles for political power and influence. Democratic 
accountability becomes a sham, and attempts to curb the independence of 
institutions that are able to expose corruption become common.67 Thirdly, 
the political manipulation of public resources enables ruling parties to stifle 
political competition and prevent the formation of a strong and credible 
opposition. Corruption and political patronage are therefore fundamentally 
65 See H Botha “Equality, Plurality and Structural Power” (2009) 25 SAJHR 1 on the links between democracy 
and equality  See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) 28-34, 36-42 and 63-66 on the relation between democracy and socio-economic 
rights
66 Classical-republican thinkers already theorised the relationship between corruption and inequality in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries  For them, civic virtue signified the capacity of citizens to place the 
common good above their own particular interests  Corruption, by contrast, referred to the propensity of 
rulers and citizens to elevate their private interests above the public interest  For thinkers like Machiavelli 
and Harrington, inequality was the root cause of corruption, as material dependence gave rise to “a state 
of affairs in which some individuals look to others  when they should be looking to the public good and 
public authority” (JGA Pocock The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (1975) 209)  In the absence of a material basis for independence, individuals lack 
the positive freedom to pursue the common good in concert with others  Inequality is thus irreconcilable 
with citizenship and threatens the very life of the republic  
67 S Choudry “‘He Had a Mandate’: The South African Constitutional Court and the African National 
Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy” (2009) 2 CCR 1 22-32
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at odds with the idea of a multiparty democracy and with the right of every 
citizen to make political choices which, according to section 19(1) of the 
Constitution, includes the right to form a political party and to participate in 
its activities and recruit members.
Seen thus, the independence of anti-corruption agencies does not simply 
have a remote bearing on a range of constitutional rights, but goes to the heart 
of our constitutional system of representative democracy and fundamentally 
affects rights of democratic citizenship. The order made in Glenister is, 
accordingly, not a misguided attempt by an unelected court to substitute its 
views on policy issues and its preference for a particular institutional design 
for those of Parliament, but an important victory for a constitutional vision 
of democracy which precludes laws and conduct which effectively insulate 
political elites from democratic supervision and contestation.
4  Concluding remarks
The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence wavers uneasily between two 
rival conceptions of democracy and its relationship to the poor. On the first 
view, regular elections secure a direct link between the government and 
electorate. It is this chain of democratic accountability and legitimacy which 
ultimately provides the strongest guarantee that the voices of the poor will 
be heard and that their needs will be attended to. The power of judicial 
review should, accordingly, be used sparingly. In the absence of clear and 
unambiguous constitutional authorisation, judicial review of decisions of 
the political branches amounts to unwarranted interference with the chain of 
legitimacy running from the people to their representatives. Besides resting 
on shaky hermeneutical foundations, this understanding of democracy is 
based on dubious assumptions about the relationship between the people and 
their representatives in government. Effectively reducing the role of “the 
people” to participation in elections every five years, it grounds the state’s 
legitimacy in the people’s supreme democratic power and, in the very same 
move, removes power from the people by insisting that they relinquished it 
to elected representatives. Moreover, this view overlooks the link between 
economic and political power and fails to resist the capacity of private 
power and influence to shape political outcomes. In addition, it accepts the 
uninterrupted chain of democratic legitimacy as a given rather than as a 
critical ideal, and legitimates the political marginalisation of the poor and 
other vulnerable groups in the name of a formal conception of democracy 
and of political equality.
The second view resists a too glib identification of the people with 
their representatives and posits a dialogical, participatory and pluralistic 
understanding of democracy. Rejecting the first view’s fixation on a single act 
through which voters delegate power to their elected representatives, it starts 
from the idea of an on-going dialogue between the people and representative 
institutions. Here the supposed unity and identity of “the people” keeps 
getting interrupted by a plurality of needs and viewpoints, as individuals and 
communities participate in decision-making processes affecting them. This 
LAW, POVERTy AND DEMOCRACy 539
       
vision seems better able to uphold the civic dignity of the poor; to ensure 
open, accountable and responsive government; and to resist the capture of 
public decision-making processes by particular interests.
Despite the progressive tenor of the judgments in Doctors for Life and 
Matatiele II, the first, more restrictive view of democracy continues to re-assert 
itself in Constitutional Court judgments. A number of reasons have been 
mooted for its persistence. According to Roux, judgments like UDM in which 
the Court relies on a formal, rather shallow conception of democracy should 
not be seen as a renunciation of the deep principle of democracy articulated 
elsewhere. They rely, rather, on a countervailing principle in terms of which 
“the judiciary should defer to the legislature in politically sensitive cases 
concerning the design of the electoral system”,68 or amount to a pragmatic 
concession to the Court’s vulnerable institutional position.69 Choudry takes 
a somewhat different view. For him, judgments like UDM and Merafong 
result from the Court’s lack of a conceptual framework for understanding 
the dynamics of a dominant party democracy.70 To these a third explanation 
can be added, which relates to the Court’s reliance on human dignity in 
cases concerning political rights. The Court has invalidated measures which, 
by denying the vote to prisoners71 or nationals residing abroad,72 could be 
construed as a denial of the equal dignity of those categories of citizens. 
However, the Court has struck a far more deferential pose in cases in which 
laws dilute the importance of the right to vote through structural changes 
to the electoral system,73 or effectively prevent some citizens from casting 
their vote as a result of the interplay between electoral rules and material 
and other forms of disadvantage.74 This raises fundamental questions over 
the relationship between dignity and democracy, and over the political 
marginalisation and silencing of the poor.75
It is hard to square the current socio-political reality with the Constitutional 
Court’s vision of an inclusive, egalitarian and participatory democracy in 
which the poor are treated as active citizens rather than faceless subjects 
or passive beneficiaries of government largess. Recent protests over poor 
service delivery, police brutality in the face of these protests, and countless 
allegations of corruption, nepotism and political patronage have once again 
68 T Roux “Democracy” in S Woolman, T Roux & M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed 
(OS 7 2006) 10-64  
69 10-57
70 Choudry (2009) CCR 5, 34
71 August v Electoral Commission 1999 3 SA 1 (CC); 1999 4 BCLR 363 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v 
NICRO 2004 5 BCLR 445 (CC)
72 Richter v Minister of Home Affairs 2009 3 SA 615 (CC); 2009 5 BCLR 448 (CC)
73 United Democratic Movement v President of the RSA 2002 11 BCLR 1179 (CC)  
74 New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA 1999 5 BCLR 489 (CC)
75 Danie Brand has argued that some of the Constitutional Court’s “meaningful engagement” orders in 
socio-economic rights cases over-emphasise the specific, individual interests at stake in a particular 
dispute, at the expense of the underlying structural causes of poverty and deprivation  JFD Brand Courts, 
Socio-Economic Rights and Transformative Politics LLD thesis University of Stellenbosch (2009) 162-
176  The Court’s emphasis in political rights cases on the dignity of individual voters has arguably had a 
similar effect, in that it has shifted the attention away from the underlying structural causes of political 
inequality, the silencing of marginalised and poor communities and a lack of democratic accountability 
and responsiveness
540 STELL LR 2011 3
       
drawn attention to the staggering gap between rich and poor and the ways in 
which political elites appear to have extricated themselves from the logic of 
democratic accountability. The critical challenge is to articulate the Court’s 
deeper vision of democracy, in which dialogue, participation and voice take 
centre stage, with an understanding of the ways in which electoral rules 
and the party system combine with inequality, corruption and patronage to 
entrench the exclusion and silencing of the poor. Only thus can we hope to 
resist the strange logic in terms of which the poor are effaced in the very act 
of their representation.
SUMMARY
The article juxtaposes two judicial understandings of democracy in relation to their implications 
for the poor. Some constitutional judgments conceive of democracy in formal terms as the capacity of 
duly elected legislatures to enact law within their constitutional area of competence. These judgments 
are loath to impose requirements that would guarantee the participatory nature of the lawmaking 
process, and reluctant to raise questions about the ruling party’s use of their numerical majority to 
stifle political opposition or shield officials from legislative oversight. Other judgments conceive 
of democracy in dialogic, participatory and pluralistic terms. It is argued that this second judicial 
conception of democracy is better placed to challenge laws and practices which effectively insulate 
social and political power from mechanisms designed to promote democratic accountability, or allow 
the wealthy and powerful to pass off their particular interests as the common good. This vision of 
democracy needs to be supplemented with a better understanding of the ways in which electoral 
rules and the party system tend to intersect with inequality, corruption and patronage to entrench the 
exclusion and silencing of the poor.
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